September 20, 2016
There are two common takes on corporate advocacy in Brussels:
1. Technical information is king
In seeking to dispel claims that it is packed full of idle bureaucrats, the EU forces its institutions to be under-staffed. Given the complexity of most dossiers, lobbyists are likely to win when they help overworked regulators by providing excellent technical information, and understand the political process well enough to provide said information at the right time. And indeed, a study on EU interest group influence by German academic Heike Kluwer identifies high-quality technical information provision as the main determinant of EU lobbying success. Given that corporates tend to invest heavily in research and most of their lobbyists are lawyer or political-scientist types rather than campaigners, dossiers on which regulators crave technical information tend to favour corporates.
2. Public opinion is king
Kluwer also states that close alignment with public opinion is a key determinant of EU lobbying success. Grumbles about the supposed democratic deficit inherent in EU policy-making makes the institutions uncomfortable. In order to demonstrate democratic legitimacy, they will frequently seek to side with public opinion. As an exercise in democracy, this may be laudable, but public opinion is not always entirely rational! Activists understand this dynamic very well and will often seek to make an issue as controversial as possible in order to sway public opinion and force the regulator’s hand. On dossiers which have a public dimension – think TTIP, shale gas, GMOs, a number of chemicals, or privacy and data protection – activists have a natural advantage over corporates in Brussels as they are adept at building and exploiting public sentiment for public policy ends.
In some instances, corporate lobbyists in Brussels are on the ‘right’ side of the public debate. Most companies and sectors lobbying on the circular economy, for instance, are promoting some form of sustainable development, which few can have gripes with. Yet given many of the issues handled in Brussels, from energy to chemicals to financial services, it is fair to say that corporates are frequently victims of the ‘public opinion is king’ dynamic. Which is often a very good thing: public opinion tends to side with the good guys. But sometimes it is not so clear-cut and a more nuanced debate would be preferable, to put it mildly.
Assuming they’re genuinely not nasty, how should companies or even entire industries respond if unfairly lambasted because they’ve become the cause célèbre of a set of activists? The easy answer is: become the sort of organisation for which doing good and being nice is part of the corporate DNA – think Disney or Unilever – and avoid being targeted much in the first place. But that’s hardly a short term fix nor is it purely the domain of a public affairs or communications function. Easy answer #2 is a staple of public affairs 101: act early. Monitor obscure blogs or journals where the alarm around your product or service might first sound, and escalation signposts like initial activist take-up, and cultivate relationships with stakeholders early rather than when the proverbial shit has hit the fan.
But what is slightly more realistic for public affairs and communications professionals in the short-term? Three thought-starters:
Accept the distinction between technical/legal vs. communications-driven PA
A majority of EU public affairs professionals are issue and policy-process experts. Which makes sense: most EU dossiers are technical/legal in nature. But when the issue in question has a highly public component, technical nitty-gritty is trumped by politicisation. Navigating a political minefield involves shifting from technical/legal to communications-centric public affairs, which is frankly an entirely different discipline. The PA professional’s conceit will often lead them to believe that they can manage the enlarged toolkit. How hard can campaign strategy, creative content conception and production, and broader stakeholder relations (esp. media) be? In truth, pretty hard – so bring in the required expertise.
Tone over content
A number of organisations would benefit from focusing on tone over content. Their instinct is to fight back; to forcefully rebut inaccuracies, citing fact and sound science. Which is commendable in theory but often less so in practice if the tone of delivery isn’t right. Right or wrong, we’re constantly reminded in today’s political climate that gut feeling often matters more than truth. And most people’s guts don’t digest aggressive corporates all that well. Activists pick battles they are most likely to win. They will therefore often target individual companies within an entire industry when they have the sort of corporate tendencies that make them easy bait: aggressive, defensive, male-dominated and immune to humility. As trite as it may sound, getting rid of the pin-striped suits, listening and being nice (and a tad boring) can be more effective than reams of rock-solid evidence.
Assuming the tone is right, delivery frequency is another factor. Organisations often simply do not make enough noise, choosing to speak and publish intermittently in a couple of channels (on or offline). Repeating the same message on repeat (within reason) is essential to campaign success, for two reasons. Information overload makes it easy to be drowned out, so without frequency, there is no basic awareness. Heuristics also plays a role. Cynical perhaps, but simply being everywhere lends legitimacy. It implies that you have nothing to hide and showcases genuine belief in your position, which may well make a few people think the issue is not as black vs. white as they may first have thought.
Clearly, these quick wins may not magically turn the tide. Strategy, message, funding, partnerships and the external environment are key. But the memo here is this: in their quest to win on communications-driven public-interest dossiers, public affairs professionals frequently spend eternities on message, but ignore the basics, like resourcing, tone and frequency. They shouldn’t.
September 8, 2016
Digital public affairs, incorporating methods like grassroots mobilisation, use of data to guide bespoke content creation, and advanced use of paid media to narrow-target audiences, is more advanced in the US than it is in Europe.
Some assume this is the case because we are at different stages of maturity. With a few notable exceptions, we probably are, but a few further factors explain why Europeans embrace digital public affairs to a lesser extent than our American cousins.
Technical vs. public interest dossiers
At the EU level especially, a majority of dossiers are technical, with limited public interest or involvement. Influence is more easily attained through the provision of high-quality technical information that facilitates policy making rather than campaigning aimed at affecting the environment in which policy is made. While there is still a place for digital, albeit on a narrow scale – e.g. high-quality online content and some social media if stakeholders are that way inclined – broader campaign methods like grassroots become somewhat obsolete. On most EU dossiers, there are few grassroots to mobilise, frankly.
Scale at national level
Publics may not exist at EU level, but they do at national level. But most European markets are small which makes organisations less inclined to explore new methods. This might seem counter-intuitive given that small markets means smaller budgets, and thus surely more scope for targeted and cost-effective digital tactics. However, small also means smaller teams covering more ground, fewer experts to drive new approaches, less saturated media markets meaning easier reach via traditional methods, and fewer degrees of separation between public affairs professionals and targets, making personal outreach more viable.
Lack of Pan-European issues
Scale would be easy if Pan-European campaigns were feasible. But Europe is too heterogeneous. Beyond obvious barriers like culture and language, campaign strategies would often need to differ even on the same issue. I remember exploring options for a campaign in German and Poland for an energy client a few years back. Seems obvious in retrospect, but local sensibilities to energy are polar opposites, with the environment and energy security the respective dominant concerns. Clearly a one-size-fits all would not work.
Availability of data
European campaigners envy the ability of their US counterparts to utilise all manner of third-party data sources in order to generate, and then target, a very narrow list of key targets. Given our history, it is perhaps unsurprising that Europeans are less comfortable with sharing data: our far stricter data protection and privacy rules preclude pesky campaigners from obtaining data that would facilitate deep segmentation and micro-targeting.
July 2, 2016
Clearly everyone’s pining for yet another article on Brexit, so here goes.
The Remain (Stronger In) campaign put in a remarkable shift. Selling an entity as maligned as the EU via a cross-party platform targeting such different communities was bloody challenging to say the least. Assembling 40,000 volunteers and organising 10,000 events was wildly impressive. Their commitment was beyond reproach. Hats off.
But they lost. And annoyingly, a fair few chapters from the campaign 101 handbook appear to have been overlooked.
I write this with the obvious benefit of hindsight, and a caveat: I’m no insider and this is all wild conjecture. And with the knowledge that they probably know the handbook very well indeed, but the campaign was simply too intense and complex to be run by the book, while responsibility for their failure to counter Leave’s emphasis on immigration lay with Labour rather than them.
But still: they lost, and as a pure political campaign, Leave was better. Remain felt like a reactive, spray-and-pray fact delivery mechanism and rebuttal system, rather than a real, targeted political campaign. Perhaps strategists outnumbered genuine campaigners in the Remain camp. While strategists are knowledge and message merchants, campaigners concentrate on targeting and emotional triggers: a prerequisite in a campaign as primal as Brexit/Bremain. Again, wild conjecture, but this could explain why Leave bossed the sound bites (Take back control!) and key campaign frames (Project Fear!)
In a blog post published before the Referendum, the campaigner Chris Rose identified a set of key groups that did not fit within obvious remain or leave clusters but could likely be persuaded to support remain, and were potentially sizeable enough to swing the vote. Utilising values research from CDSM in tandem with Shalom Schwartz’ values model, he wrote the following:
Whoever manages to appeal to values… such as achievement hedonism, stimulation and self-direction, is likely to swing the decision. In political parlance this means establishing a ‘narrative’ of optimism, the prospects of future success, enjoyment and looking good, whether as a country, a business or individually… The benefits of Euro-railing, enjoyment of foreign holidays, making friends and having a good time doing business with Europe, and the endorsement of celebrities for the same, are likely to have more effect on this than any amount of ‘economic argument’.
With a campaign strategy centred almost purely on the economy, this optimistic narrative was sorely missing, although a fair few celebrities did make an appearance (Golden Balls Becks was terrific). I appreciate that telling an unemployed bricklayer in Huddersfield that Euro-railing is ace would result in a bloody nose rather than a cross in the Remain box, but I live in London where “achievement hedonism, stimulation and self-direction” are rife and the positive narrative could have resonated. I read local papers, listen to local radio and obviously see billboards and the like, but I’m not sure I ever came across a positive Remain message targeted specifically at the likes of me.
On the topic of targeting, beyond media, were people targeted personally? I’m Johnny Foreign and perhaps they knew that, but most of my British friends are archetypal remainers. Not one of them received campaign material from Remain, personally targeted at them via mail, email or social media. Perhaps the campaign assumed their votes were in the bag, but given that turnout was such a major concern, surely that was a tad risky. Maybe they were hard-up and spent their dinero elsewhere. But everyone I know received Vote Leave (and Leave.eu) guff addressed directly at them, meaning they’d gone to the effort of obtaining mailing lists. Again, what the hell do I know, but surely Remain should have done so too, especially given the demographics involved, at least as a last-minute get out the vote effort?
The campaign 101 handbook also tells us that framing is key to campaign success. If your side fails to set the frame, the opponent’s frame should be ignored, and a counter-frame introduced. Responding to an opponent’s frame merely reinforces it. But Remain constantly let Leave set the frame, and then proceeded to reinforce it.
Take Project Fear, a stroke of campaign-framing genius. In just two words, it decimated Remain’s strategy of cajoling sensible Brits into voting remain for fear of the economic unknown. Remain’s response? More figures, usually quoted by men in suits working for organisations known by an acronym, which reinforced Leave’s frame: they were fear mongers. With their strategy decimated by two words, there was no obvious attempt at setting a new strategy, countering with a positive frame, or introducing a different frame to define Leave. They doubled down on the economy and fear, to no effect.
At a more granular level, when faced with the £350 million nonsense, their response was to break it down in detail to prove the figure was actually lower. Again, this merely reinforced the “Europe costs loads” frame. Where was their take on the EU’s cost? The Brickwall video that did the rounds contained an example of a figure that could have offset the £350 million: 10 to1 i.e. the UK gets back £10 for every £1 spent. Does the figure hold up to close scrutiny? Probably not, but sadly that’s not the point, neither does the £350 million. I appreciate that it would have been difficult to ignore it, given its physical prominence on the side of that bloody bus, but some semblance of response beyond dissection would have been nice.
When studying modern political campaigns, one can’t help but be awestruck by their ability to identify and target tiny communities of support. Did Remain narrow target? Again, what the hell do I know, maybe they did, but it didn’t seem like it. One perhaps trite example: Glastonbury took place during referendum week. The Glastonbury demographic clearly sits heavily in the remain camp, and there were surely tens of thousands of votes at play. Apparently there was no effort to reach people with tickets to urge them to get their postal votes sorted. A petty gripe perhaps, but again, if turnout was a concern, surely relatively minor initiatives such as this represented a no brainer.
Remain / Stronger In put in some serious hours. But ultimately they failed. Perhaps it was inevitable, given the deep-rooted antipathy towards the EU built up over decades, the rage felt by huge swathes of the electorate, Leave’s willingness to play the immigration card so forcefully and cynically, and the fact that the sheer assortment in their camp partly neutralised each individual faction. How could Labour credibly campaign in down-and-out communities in the North-East while sharing a stage (metaphorically) with Tories talking about protecting the “markets” and doing the rounds with bankers ? Tricky.
I get all that, but the fact remains: why the clumsy responses to great campaign manoeuvres by Leave; why did they double down on the economy and fear when a quick study of potential voter groups demonstrated that a positive narrative could work; why were key demographics not targeted more directly; and why were get out the vote efforts not more aggressive given that turnout was a concern?
We’ve been told for years now that traditional public affairs (face to face, technical lobbying) is not as effective as it used to be in Brussels. The logic is that many issues, and even entire industries like financial services or oil and gas, are now “political”, meaning decision-making on legislative matters is no longer based on the rational analysis of available information, but rather, the tide of public opinion.
For this reason, the adage goes, public affairs professionals need the support of marketing-communications professionals more adept at applying techniques that can affect the opinion of constituencies, with a view to shaping the environment in which decision-making takes place, rather than just the decision-making itself.
In other words, PA professionals need to run “campaigns” that seek to build and/or showcase some level of public support in parallel to lobbying on policy. Good campaigns should be focussed and simple: channel agnostic, definable in a single sentence, with a single and specific goal, a visual identity and end-date. Fish Fight was a PA campaign, aimed at banning fish discards. As are Renovate Europe and Keep me Posted in the UK, looking to set deep renovation targets for buildings and banning email only billing, respectively.
So does campaigning represent the future of EU public affairs? Yes and no.
However detached Brussels may be from real European publics, its legislators gain legitimacy in part by demonstrating that they respect and represent public constituencies. Hence why some activist campaigns have been so successful. Fish Fight and ACTA campaigners took issues that were not on the public agenda, put them there, and flipped decisions that had previously not been in doubt. On the corporate side, scrutinised organisations need to build and harness the support of specific constituencies, often through campaigns, in order to legitimise their policy objectives. Think pharma and health care professionals or patients, agrochemicals and farmers, or tech and entrepreneurs. But campaigning is not the dominion of corporates on the defensive. There is real value in campaigning when one is on the “right” side of the public debate, or even when no “right” or “wrong” sides have been defined and early mover advantage may be gained.
Having said all that, organisations should be less hasty at hiring marketers and creative agencies while eschewing technical expertise. Traditional public affairs remains dominant in Brussels.
In her study of interest group activity in Brussels, Heike Kluwer concludes that the quality of technical information provision remains the foremost determinant of lobbying success, ahead of demonstrating market power and public support. Her work is admittedly not very recent, but there’s little reason to assume much has changed.
Apart from certain issues (the likes of GMOs and shale gas), national publics remain largely disengaged, and legislative activity remains highly technical. Put simply, on most issues, there is no public debate and no constituency to mobilise, so campaigning would not provide a competitive advantage to public affairs practitioners
And even when an issue has been politicised, better lobbying can still win the day. The most notable example is probably that of mandatory food labelling around the turn of the decade, when better lobbying arguably meant the food industry’s favoured system, guideline daily amounts (GDA), prevailed over the traffic light system endorsed by consumer groups and health advocates.
So which is it: to campaign or not to campaign? As ever, it depends. If an issue has been highly politicised and external forces are reducing prospects for lobbying success, there may be no choice. If an issue is slightly off the radar but campaigning can improve the likelihood of success, it should probably be added to the mix. But with three major caveats: 1) campaigning is usually expensive and difficult, so adequate resources need to be available, which is often tricky given intractable siloes (e.g. PA and legal vs. marketing and communications); 2) campaign success relies on building and showcasing support from a key constituency, whether small or large, so at least one such constituency needs to exist; and (controversially) 3) if the other side is ineffective and failing to win over a major constituency, campaigning may not be necessary even on a somewhat politicised matter (e.g. food labelling).
April 15, 2016
Most mainstream British media outlets are calling for the UK to leave the EU, and its single most potent media entity, the BBC, has to remain on the fence somewhat given that it is publicly funded. As things stand, just about as many Brits would like to leave the EU as favour remaining.
In the US, other than a couple of New York tabloids, mainstream media describes Trump as an inept, vile and dangerous charlatan. Yet a majority of Republican primary voters across every demographic would be comfortable having him as their President.
Clearly, we’re not comparing like for like. Referendum polls comprise every UK demographic, while Republican primary voters represent a very small proportion of all Americans. If the entire US were polled, support for Trump would be lower than support for Brexit in the UK. And while Trump and Brexit are both populist-driven phenomena that portray a paranoid worldview in which elites and foreigners are ganging up on the common man, non-swivelling Brexit types do have some intellectually legitimate claims, although they’re largely crowded out by vitriolic, tabloid inspired foreigner-bashing, while Trump is pure populism.
But the paradox of simultaneous, populist spectacles occurring within such wildly contrasting media realities does raise interesting questions about media influence.
Does the volume of pro-Brexit press simply imply that British mainstream media is more influential than its American counterpart? Quite likely. The US media landscape is far more fragmented, comprising highly partisan radio stations and blogs that constitute the only source of news for many people. Despite dwindling readership figures, mainstream media remains quite dominant in the UK.
A more interesting nuance is the notion that media influence can work back to front. Media opposition in the US is inverse to Trump’s popularity, given that his entire campaign narrative is that out-of-touch elites, including mainstream media, are the enemy of the common man. So the theory reads that US media remains influential amongst Trump’s constituencies, but in persuading them to take the furthest contrasting view possible.
Another theory suggests that the Republican establishment and conservative media – Fox News in particular – have been instrumental in creating an environment in which Trump is an acceptable candidate. David Remnick of the New Yorker has written that the Republican establishment has exploited the “darkest American undercurrents” from Nixon’s Southern Strategy of attracting voters opposed to civil rights through to the birther movement. Their perpetual hostility and intransigence, with the likes of Fox as their mouthpiece, have gradually changed the nature of what is tolerable in American political discourse, and Trump is its ultimate consequence. Although Trump is too extreme now even for Fox News, media has arguably been highly influential in paving the way for his ascendance.
A further interesting area worth exploring is media influence vs. personal salience. Supporting Trump often represents a response to personal grievances, while Brexit remains a fairly distant and abstract political matter. Trump supporters grew up in a world of simple certainties: America was the greatest nation on earth, the American dream was alive and well, and Americans could look forward to a life of prosperity and happiness. That’s not entirely the case anymore, and however misguided, they believe in the simple and brutal solutions Trump espouses, and think that he will turn the clock back. Brexit is about the EU. No one cares that much about the EU. For all the jingoistic talk of taking power back and controlling borders, most Brexit supporters do not think quitting the EU is a last resort to making their deteriorating lives better. They support Brexit because it is broadly in line with their worldview, as represented by the media they consume. I suspect there is near perfect alignment between papers people read and how they will vote in the referendum. In summary: most Brexit supporters don’t know or care all that much about Brexit, however excitable they get in the run-up to the referendum, and choose to adhere to the views of their favoured news source, while Trump supporters care very much about their livelihoods and fervently believe in Trump, but are more likely to have relied on gut instinct and their peers to decide he’s their man, rather than some newspaper.
So what do Brexit and Trump tell us about media influence? All wild conjecture on my part, but probably the following: that it still matters greatly, but in a more fluid and complex way than ever; and that its influence is greater on matters that people are less committed to, as they require the media outlet that represents their world view to define their position.
April 12, 2016
I’ve made a couple of further tweaks to my original digital public affairs wheel, in which I linked three components of day-to-day PA (delivering a message to policy-makers and related audiences; building relationships; intelligence gathering and analysis) with relevant online activities and tools. Since 2014, the wheel has included two further disciplines – campaigning (building and mobilising support) and the oft-overlooked internal communications (informing and engaging internal stakeholders) – and this is a slightly cleaned up version of that. Any glaring omissions etc. please give me a shout.